By Dr. Sobhanlal Datta Gupta
The verdict of the 18th Lok Sabha polls, it goes without saying, was a slap on the face of the BJP and signified its moral defeat. It has also been indicative of the comeback of the Congress and a signal to the regional parties that if they stick together, the cementing factor being secularism, then even the BJP can be successfully confronted. That way it is a moral victory for the anti-BJP coalition, represented, howsoever fragile it appeared, by the INDIA alliance. But amidst these two positive developments the most disturbing thing that has a dampening effect on the election scenario is the performance of the Left.
In this context I would very specifically focus on West Bengal, because this time there was a feeling shared by many that the Left would score fairly well here, its tally reaching almost double digit figure. But what has happened is not only demoralizing for the Left, but quite ominous. First, in all the seats excepting two, the Left candidates have lost their deposits. Second, the BJP has virtually come up to the second position in almost all the constituencies, where the TMC has won. And this has happened in places where the BJP has no organizational base, no machinery for election campaign and where it fielded candidates who were totally nonentity , without virtually any public presence.
Third, in comparison, the Left, the CPI(M) in particular, brought in new faces, young and dedicated, conducted intense campaign, worked overtime day in and day out, and, apparently, made an impressive impact on the voters. Not only a section of the public, but quite a good number of pretty senior Left leaders confidently announced that this time the Left would open its account after a long spell of political drought, bagging at least 4-6 seats, if not more. This debacle requires deep introspection, a ruthless self-criticism, but with an open mind, without being trapped in mental blocks shaped by obstinacy and wild, imaginary musings, unrelated to hardcore, although unpalatable, political realities.
But before indulging in this exercise, it needs to be kept in mind that the performance of the Left in West Bengal cannot be separated from the all-India perspective. Three crucial points demand attention of the Left, which cannot be brushed aside. One: At the all-India level its tally did not reach double digit figure and the 8 seats it secured [CPI(M) :4, CPI : 2 and CPI (ML), Liberation : 2] were largely gifted by their powerful allies in their respective states. Two: the anti-BJP campaign was spearheaded by the non-Left forces, namely, Congress, through Rahul Gandhi’s Bharat Jodo Yatra, Samajwadi Party and other regional parties, where the Left’s presence was marginal.
Three: In many places, i.e., in Kerala, the Congress allowed very little space to the Left. Had the Congress been more accommodative, the Left’s performance could have improved. In other words, the Left, on the all-India plane, had very little leverage vis-à-vis the non-Left forces. Frankly speaking, at the national level it was a BJP-anti BJP binary, where the richest dividends were reaped by the Congress, followed by the non-Left, and the Left trailing them as a part of the anti-BJP constituency, but without the scope of playing any leading role.
It is precisely this scenario which was replicated in West Bengal and which the Left, the CPI(M) in particular, failed to understand. The question needs to be addressed at two levels. One: why the BJP-anti BJP binary worked ? Two: what were the fault lines of the Left?
Level one: First, there was the consideration of security. Those who felt threatened by the TMC’s strong arm tactics, keeping in mind its most inglorious track record over the last one decade, voted for BJP, the argument being that BJP with its money and muscle power was the only force which could unseat TMC and give them protection. Even sections of the Left, particularly in the rural belt, who were victims of TMC’s political vendetta and misrule, were convinced by this logic. Again, this same insecurity syndrome deeply affected those vulnerable sections of society, for whom BJP was a political and cultural threat. They voted for TMC, considering the latter as the saviour.
It is for this reason that the entire minority vote shifted to TMC. Second, in this binary, even sections of the Left strongly believed that it is not the Left, which is a marginalized force in West Bengal after 2011, but TMC which can really challenge BJP and, therefore, despite the excellent candidature of the CPI(M)’s young brigade, to vote for them would be an electoral waste, leading to division of votes, and which would indirectly strengthen BJP. Third, it is on this score that CPI(M)’s public campaign that the BJP and TMC constituted two sides of the same coin, that the TMC supremo had an understanding with the RSS and that she was guided by Nagpur in her everyday activities, was wholly rejected by the electorate.
This is an issue the complexity of which CPI(M) failed to gauge. This setting theory which was CPI(M)’s brainchild, went completely wrong on two counts. One : There are evidences galore that at the highest level there is, indeed, this setting between TMC and BJP, which explains why the TMC supremo and her cohorts at the top rung of the party are not touched by the CBI or ED, despite impeccable evidences, why they virtually continue to enjoy political immunity, notwithstanding the fact that the shadow boxing or the verbal duel between the Prime Minister and the TMC continues unabated, giving the public the impression that they are really at loggerheads and spitefully intolerant at each other.
Two: at the lower level, broadly speaking, this setting does not operate, because there are strong evidences which suggest that the considerations of control of power at the grassroots level inevitably lead to confrontation between BJP and TMC, where BJP is led by the outlook that it has to create and expand its own base, while TMC is driven by the imperative of retaining its base and not allowing BJP to enter its homeground. In other words, both the parties, by sacrificing their ordinary or even middle level workers at the lower level, smoothly maintain their political equation at the top. Since the setting is invisible, while the conflict is visible, the campaign that the confrontation between BJP and TMC at the ground level is nothing but a staged phenomenon, has hardly convinced anyone.
Level two: This needs to be understood in terms of its multiple dimensions. One : In West Bengal, the Left thrived historically by riding on the waves of anti-Congressism and the confrontation between the Left, especially CPI(M) and the Congress, has an infamous, bitter history. When for electoral considerations the Left switched gear and struck up an alliance with the Congress, the cadres of the Congress did not take it lying down. It has been reported by many that a large section of Congress workers have actually voted for TMC and not the Left, although the Left has broadly sided with the Congress.
Two: The left failed to understand that the 18th Lok Sabha polls addressed an all India phenomenon, namely, whether BJP is to gain a thumping majority or its wings will be clipped? This was the essence of the binary and the Left in West Bengal hardly addressed this issue. For the Left, TMC and BJP being equivalent, it overrated the threat of TMC, allowing TMC to thwart BJP and marginalize the Left by default. This debacle, that way, was largely Left’s own making. Three: The Left’s underestimation of BJP was guided by the wrong theoretical understanding that any kind of authoritarianism is not fascism, and that despite all its fault lines and ignominious record of misrule TMC sans ideology and long term political strategy is no match for BJP, since it is guided only by the politics of immediacy. This precisely was Left’s understanding too, resulting in its failure to properly understand the threat of BJP.
Four: the Left suffered from a feeling of complacency that the Bengali psyche is free from communal virus, failing to understand that there is a strong undercurrent of communalism flowing in the blood of an ordinary Bengali. This actually explains why the BJP came up to the second position without any groundwork, since communalism has gripped a large section of the Bengali Hindus, this being the foundation of a solid Hindu vote bank for the BJP in future. Five: the way TMC’s populism, as manifest in its dole politics, was handled by the Left, as manifest in its ridiculing of the Chief Minister and her ‘welfarist’ programmes, was not liked by the ordinary masses, the women in particular. The massive voting by women for TMC candidates in the rural constituencies should be an eye opener for the CPI(M) leadership.
Through her cheap populism, the TMC supremo, has, since 2011, succeeded in convincing the poor and the marginalized in particular, that the TMC government, through its programmes aims to empower them, at times through cash transfer, at times by providing cheap health care or cycle or rice and pulse. Finally, the campaign conducted by the TMC that the BJP government was not releasing funds for the MGNREGA and thereby endangering the livelihood of the poor, making their life insecure, worked greatly in favour of the TMC. The CPI(M) completely failed to understand how the TMC chief used her populist strategy to win over the poor, especially the rural masses, and hoodwink the Left. Unless the CPI(M) looks at its own face in the mirror, it will be very difficult for the Bengal CPI(M) to turn around in the days to come. (IPA Service)
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